Introduction
In the late 1960's a physicist, Stephen Wiesner, had the idea that the uncertainty principle could be used for cryptography (though he published his result much later Wie83]). His idea was that it would be possible to transmit the values of two pieces of information using beams of photons in a way that would make only one of them readable at the receiver's choosing. This notion, which he called \multiplexing" is remarkably similar to the \one-out-of-two Oblivious Transfer" to be reinvented many years later EGL83]. A decade after his original invention, Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard brought Wiesner's idea back to life in a Crypto '82 talk. Subsequently, they used quantum cryptographic principles to implement basic cryptographic protocols, such as secret key exchange and coin ipping by telephone BB84]. There has been very recently renewed interest in quantum cryptography because a working prototype of the quantum key exchange channel has been successfully built at the IBM T. J. Watson Research Laboratory, Yorktown Heights BBBSS90] .
In recent times, the importance of cryptographic primitives has been brought to light by the work of many researchers whose goal is to characterize precisely the primitives su cient for the implementation of various cryptographic protocols. One of these primitives is a Bit Commitment Scheme. The importance and usefulness of such a primitive is enlightened by the work of GMW86,BCC88] to mention just a few.
While such primitives are usually built under computational complexity assumptions, it is sometimes possible to build such things based on assumptions of a di erent nature as pointed out by the work mentioned earlier of Wie83, BB84] . The current paper presents the state-of-the-art in the technology of building a bit commitment scheme on a quantum mechanical assumption. The applications are numerous, including secure two-party computation.
Supported in part by Canada NSERC grant A4107. y Supported in part by NSERC Postgraduate and Postdoctorate Scholarships. This research was performed in part while the author was a graduate student at M.I.T. and while visiting the IBM Almaden Research Center. For a complete coverage of the physics of quantum cryptography, please consult BB84]. The linear polarization of photons is a quantum state. In general, the value of this variable cannot be determined exactly. According to quantum mechanics, although the value of the polarization can be any angle in the (real) interval 0 ; 180 ), only a boolean (two states) predicate can be measured about this variable. Moreover, only one such measurement can be performed on any given photon because the measurement itself necessarily destroys the information. For instance, let be the polarization of a photon. Assuming that it is known a priori that is either 0 or 90 , the predicate \Is = 0 ?" can be measured accurately for these two quantum states. On the other hand, even if is known to be either 0 or 45 , then no measuring apparatus can distinguish between these two states with certainty, although some probabilistic information can be obtained. If we have no constrain on the set of possible values for then answering \Is = 0 ?" will result in a probabilistic answer determined by the value of : it will always be \yes" if = 0 , otherwise it will be \no" with a probability that ranges from 0 to 1 as ranges from 0 to 90 .
It is not a matter of technology, it is not that no one has a good enough device to gure out ; quantum theory claims that it is impossible to determine this value with certainty. In a sense, the value does not really exist: it is just a probability distribution. However, it is possible to build a device that always says \yes" if = 0 and always says \no" when = 90 . In general, with such a device, Prob(device says \yes"j ) = cos 2 ( ). This can be obtained by combining a Wallaston prism with two photomultipliers (photon detectors). See gure 1. Consider a Wallaston prism set for distinguishing polarization angles ' from ' + 90 . A photon polarized at angle will come out of this Wallaston prism on the right side with probability cos 2 ( ? ') (and will then be repolarized at angle ') and on the left side with complement probability sin 2 ( ? ') (and will then be repolarized at angle ' + 90 ). According to quantum mechanics, this device is the best that can be built with respect to measuring .
3 Review of earlier quantum protocols 3.1 A bit commitment scheme Consider two parties: S and R. Assume that S has a bit b in mind, to which she would like to be committed toward R. That is, S wishes to provide R with a piece of evidence that she has a bit in mind and that she cannot change it. Meanwhile, R should not be able to tell from that evidence what b is.
The rst quantum bit commitment scheme ever proposed is due to Bennett and Brassard BB84] (actually, the protocol they describe is only claimed to implement coin tossing, but it is obvious how to modify it in order to implement bit commitment). Let us brie y review this protocol and its main weakness before describing our new scheme in Section 4. Assume that S wishes to commit to bit b toward R. Let s be a security parameter. 3: if this condition is satis ed for all i then R outputs \accept" else R outputs \reject"
First note that if S is honest then the condition is always satis ed. Now suppose that a cheating S tries to \commit" in a way that will enable her to open B as b or b at her later choice. In order to achieve this, she must nd two strings B The resulting protocol can be broken exactly if the bit commitment scheme can be broken.
The problem of dependence
As mentioned in BB84] the bit commitment scheme of section 3.1 and the resulting coin tossing protocol can be defeated in theory using the consequences of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen \para-dox". The interested reader can consult their paper for a more detailed explanation. We call this problem \dependence" because E-P-R is based on the fact that it is possible to create pairs of photons with a dependence relation between their polarizations (it is possible to have some correlation between measurements). In practice, this kind of attack is rather improbable because the technology necessary to perform it is far beyond the current available technology, and because even a small failure in the cheater's technology will result in loss of his possibility of cheating. Nevertheless, from a theoretical point of view, it is important to get around this di culty.
In the next section we o er our new bit commitment scheme, which cannot be broken through E-P-R. 
and sends it to R using the following protocol. 
Now we focus our attention on this ratio: From this we conclude that S may succeed in opening B in both ways with probability at most s for some < 1. 2 Notice, however, that even a few transmission errors will lead R to believe that S is cheating and thus to reject her commitments even when she is honest. The solution to this problem is not at all addressed in the current paper and will be the topic of another paper dealing with transmission errors in quantum protocols. That paper is currently in preparation with Charles Bennett BBC90].
Finally, we have Theorem 4.4 This protocol cannot be broken using E-P-R. b i;j = b and taking majority on the rows. Actually this possibility is, as far as the authors know, the only possible way to cheat our protocol. Fortunately, not only is no technology available to do coherent measurements, but also physicists do not even know how to get photons to interact in ways that could lead to such a measurement. Therefore, although such a possibility exists in theory, in practice there should be very little concern that the protocol be broken this way.
5 Have we won anything?
As it turns out, having two di erent schemes is better than one: One can build a Coin Tossing Protocol that can be broken only if one can implement both the E-P-R attack and coherent measurements. Consider the following protocol: This protocol can be broken only if S can implement the E-P-R attack as well as the coherent measurement attack. R has no way to cheat whatsoever, unless he can design an apparatus that can transmit information faster than the speed of light. The proof of these claims will be provided in the journal version of the paper.
Conclusion
In the light of ongoing progress in physics, it is reasonable to fear that the E-P-R attack on the bit commitment scheme (or coin ipping protocol) of BB84] could be implemented. The commitment scheme we have presented in this paper does not yield to this attack. Unfortunately, we can still describe a possible attack on this new scheme, which is based on an unveri ed belief about quantum mechanics (unlike E-P-R, which has been veri ed experimentally). Can one build such a scheme, unbreakable in an absolute way, based solely on the equations of quantum mechanics? We cannot answer this question at this time.
Still we have been able to build a coin-tossing protocol that is secure unless both attacks can be implemented. This seems to indicate that maybe Bit Commitment is more than Coin-Tossing since, at this time, we are unable to o er a Bit Commitment scheme with this same level of security.
